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The employment and hours worked of young individuals fluctuate much more over the business cycle
than those of prime-aged individuals. Understanding the mechanism underlying this observation is
key to explaining the volatility of aggregate hours over the cycle. We argue that the joint behavior
of age-specific hours and wages in the U.S. data point to differences in the cyclical characteristics
of labor demand. To articulate this view, we consider a production technology displaying capital-experience
complementarity. We estimate the key parameters governing the degree of complementarity and show
that the model can account for the behavior of age-specific hours and wages while generating a series


















The employment and hours worked of young individuals uctuate much more over the business
cycle than for the prime-aged. The hypothesis in this paper is that understanding the mechanisms
underlying this observation, while interesting in its own right, has the potential to shed light on a
long standing puzzle in the business cycle literature: why aggregate hours are nearly as volatile as
output.
Our hypothesis is based on the fact that cyclical uctuations in aggregate hours are dispropor-
tionately accounted for by young workers. In the postwar era 15-29 year olds account for about
one quarter of total hours worked in the U.S.; however, this same group accounts for almost one
half of the the volatility of aggregate hours at the business cycle frequency.
By contrast, recent work in business cycle theory has, with few exceptions, focused on models
with homogenous labor input. As a result, much of the literature cannot address these dierences by
age, and importantly, the question of why young labor input is so volatile over the cycle. Developing
a quantitative theory that can account for the volatility of this age group is likely to be crucial to
understanding the volatility of aggregate hours and, ultimately, the mechanisms that amplify and
propagate business cycle uctuations.
This is not the rst paper to address this dimension of heterogeneity in analyzing labor market
uctuations. Rios-Rull (1996) and Gomme, Rogerson, Rupert, and Wright (2004) study models
with age dierences in hours volatility owing to life-cycle considerations (e.g., preferences for home
and market production, and eciency units of hours worked that dier by age). They show that life-
cycle factors are successful at explaining volatility dierences between the prime-aged and those near
retirement age, but cannot account for the much greater volatility of young workers as compared to
all others. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2008) consider a life-cycle model in which eciency units of
labor are accumulated while working via learning-by-doing. This generates substantial dierences
in volatility by age, but at the expense of dampening the volatility of hours worked overall. Hence,
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2008) show that the learning-by-doing model actually under-performs
relative to the standard real business cycle (RBC) model in matching the volatility of aggregate
hours over the cycle.
1In this paper, we maintain comparability with the RBC literature by studying a model that
represents a minimal deviation from the standard model. Within the RBC framework, dierences
across age groups arise from dierences in preferences (or succinctly, dierences in labor supply),
factors relating to technology (labor demand), or both.1
How does one distinguish between these two potential channels? We suggest that the joint
behavior of age-specic hours and wages over the cycle sheds light on this question. As we document
in Sections 2 and 3, young individuals in the U.S. not only experience greater hours volatility, but
also have greater wage volatility than prime-aged individuals. Any modication to the RBC model
incorporating age-specic labor supply dierences alone would not be able explain this fact.2 Jointly
matching the behavior of hours and wages in the RBC framework requires a role for dierences in
cyclical labor demand.
To articulate this view, we consider an environment characterized by labor demand dierences
due to capital-experience complementarity in production. The large body of work studying capital-
skill complementarity has concentrated on education as a proxy for skill (see Krusell, Ohanian,
Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), and the references therein for anaylsis relating to the post-war
education premium; and see Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) for analysis of the business cycle
implications of capital-skill complementarity). We concentrate on the other signicant observable
dimension of skill emphasized in Mincerian wage regressions, namely labor market experience.
To highlight the potential in this approach, we assume that there are only two groups of workers,
young and old; we posit that an individual's age directly determines his or her labor market expe-
rience. With technology exhibiting capital-experience complementarity, dierences in the cyclical
demand for experienced and inexperienced labor arise naturally. As an extreme case, suppose that
capital and old, or experienced, labor are perfect complements, while capital and young, or inex-
perienced, labor display some substitutability. If capital services are a state variable and rms are
prot maximizing and price-taking, any shock generating a response in inputs results in variation
1By RBC framework, we are referring to neoclassical models in which households and rms take all prices as given,
and interact in competitive spot markets. The papers discussed in the previous paragraph model age dierences as
owing to labor supply characteristics. See Nagyp al (2004) for an alternative approach highlighting the interaction
between age and worker-occupation match.
2Section 4.4 and Appendix A.3 discusses this in depth.
2in only the quantity of young labor hired.
More generally, we view our theoretical mechanism as speaking to the existence of complemen-
tarity in production between experienced labor and factors that are in xed short-run supply to the
rm. These factors may include organizational capital, rm know-how, or operational knowledge
that inherently require the presence of experienced labor. Since this type of knowledge or capital
is hard to adjust in the short-run, it is natural that cyclical uctuations in output result in greater
variation of inputs like young or inexperienced labor that are less tied to these factors.
Of course, the measurement of factors such as organizational capital or rm know-how is very
dicult. The challenge in this paper is to account for the observed dierences in hours volatility in
a quantitative manner. This motivates our modeling choice, as specifying complementarity between
physical capital and experienced labor. The availability of high-quality data relating to these factor
inputs allows us to discipline our analysis.
We estimate the key structural parameters governing the degree of capital-experience comple-
mentarity in a parsimonious manner. Our strategy entails estimating these parameters from the
model's factor demand equations, exploiting the identication that emerges from the relationship
between aggregate prices and quantities observed in the U.S. data. It is worth noting that our
estimation strategy does not target dierences in the cyclical volatility of hours.
Based on this structural estimation we simulate the model economy. We nd that the model
generates age-specic hours volatilities that are similar to those observed in the data. As a by-
product of this success, the model generates volatility of aggregate hours that is very close to that
of aggregate output. We then show that the model can account for the joint behavior of age-specic
hours and relative wages.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we document dierences in the volatility of hours
worked by age, and indicate the importance of this dimension of disaggregation relative to other
demographic factors. Empirical evidence guiding our modeling approach is presented in Section
3. Section 4 presents our model with capital-experience complementarity, along with analytical
results on the response of age-specic hours and wages to business cycle shocks. Section 5 discusses
the quantitative specication of our model, and Section 6 presents results for the model's cyclical
3properties relative to the U.S. data. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.
2 The Cyclicality of Age-Specic Hours
In this section, we analyze the responsiveness of market work over the U.S. business cycle for data
disaggregated by age. We consider both the behavior of hours worked and unemployment by age.
2.1 Age-Specic Hours
Our approach to studying dierences in business cycle volatility by age is similar to that of Gomme,
Rogerson, Rupert, and Wright (2004). We use data from the March supplement of the CPS
to construct annual series for per capita hours worked from 1963 to 2005 for individuals within
specic age groups. We also construct an aggregate series for all individuals 15 years and older.
See Appendix A.6 for detailed information on data sources used throughout the paper.
To extract the high frequency component of hours worked, we remove the trend from each
series using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter. Since we are interested in uctuations at business
cycle frequencies (those higher than 8 years), we use a smoothing parameter of 6.25 for annual
data.3
Table 1 presents results on the time series volatility of hours worked in the U.S. for the 15-19,
20-24, 25-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-64 year-old age groups. The rst row presents the percent
standard deviation of the detrended age-specic series. We see a decreasing relationship between
the volatility of hours worked and age, with an upturn close to retirement age.
We are not interested in the high frequency uctuations in these time series per se, but rather
those that are correlated with the business cycle. For each age-specic series, we identify the
business cycle component as the projection on a constant, current detrended output, and on current
and lagged detrended aggregate hours; we refer to these as the cyclical hours worked series. The
second row of Table 1 reports the R2 from these regressions. This is high for most age groups,
indicating that the preponderance of high frequency uctuations are attributable to the business
3Through analysis of the transfer function of the HP lter, Ravn and Uhlig (2002) nd this to be the optimal
value for annual data. Using a similar approach, Burnside (2000) recommends a smoothing parameter value of 6.65.
Finally, see Baxter and King (1999), who recommend a value of 10, through visual inspection of the transfer function.
Throughout this paper, we have repeated our analysis of annual data using the band-pass lter proposed by Baxter
and King (1999), removing uctuations less frequent than 8 years. The results are essentially identical in all cases.
4Table 1: Volatility of Hours Worked by Age Group, U.S.
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64
ltered volatility 4.351 2.130 1.471 1.073 0.790 0.824 1.309
R2 0.79 0.80 0.83 0.88 0.89 0.72 0.30
cyclical volatility 3.868 1.902 1.318 1.014 0.752 0.705 0.708
share of hours (%) 3.34 10.64 13.23 26.12 23.98 17.73 4.97
share of hours volatility (%) 11.62 18.21 15.70 23.83 16.23 11.25 3.17
Notes: Data from the March CPS, 1968-2005. Filtered volatility is the percentage standard
deviation of HP-ltered log data. Cyclical volatility is the percentage standard deviation of HP-
ltered log data as projected on aggregate business cycle measures, with the R2 from this projection
reported. Share of hours is the sample average share of aggregate hours worked by the age group.
Share of hours volatility is the age group's share of \aggregate hours volatility," the average of
age-specic cyclical volatilities weighted by hours shares.
cycle. The exception is the 60-64 age group: here a larger fraction of uctuations are due to
age-specic, non-cyclical shocks.
The third row indicates the percent standard deviation of the cyclical age-specic series. Com-
pared to row one, the largest dierences between ltered and cyclical volatilities are for those in
their 60s, reecting the point made immediately above. The data indicates a pattern of decreas-
ing volatility with age. The young experience much greater cyclical volatility in hours than all
others. Moreover, the dierences across age groups are large. The standard deviation of cyclical
hours uctuations for 15-19 and 20-24 year old workers is 5 and 2.5 times that of 50-59 year olds,
respectively.4
The fourth row indicates the average share of aggregate hours worked during the sample period
by each age group. The fth row indicates the share of \aggregate hours volatility" attributable
to each age group. Here, aggregate hours volatility is represented by the weighted average of age-
specic cyclical volatilities, with weights reecting an age group's share of aggregate hours. What is
4These results corroborate the ndings of Gomme, Rogerson, Rupert, and Wright (2004), and extend them to
include data from the 2001 recession. See also Clark and Summers (1981), Rios-Rull (1996), and Nagyp al (2004) who
document dierences in cyclical sensitivity across age groups. More broadly, the literature documents dierences as a
function of skill; see for instance, Kydland and Prescott (1993) and Hoynes (2000), and the references therein. Note
that those studies are conned to the analysis of U.S. data.
5Table 2: Volatility of Hours Worked by Age and Gender, U.S.
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64
ltered volatility
female 4.865 2.067 1.594 1.141 0.955 1.034 1.826
male 4.664 2.774 1.645 1.257 0.854 0.891 1.906
cyclical volatility
female 4.087 1.726 1.183 0.872 0.776 0.706 0.887
male 3.829 2.208 1.472 1.151 0.762 0.695 0.826
Notes: Data from the March CPS, 1968-2005. Filtered volatility is the percentage standard
deviation of HP-ltered log data. Cyclical volatility is the percentage standard deviation of HP-
ltered log data as projected on aggregate business cycle measures.
striking is the extent to which uctuations in aggregate hours are disproportionately accounted for
by young workers. Although those aged 15-29 make up only about one quarter of aggregate hours
worked, they account for nearly one half of aggregate hours volatility. By contrast, prime-aged
workers in their 40s and 50s account for more than 40% of hours, but only about 25% of hours
volatility.
These age patterns remain when we undertake further demographic breakdowns. We summarize
these results, found in Tables 2 and 3. Firstly, we disaggregate the U.S. workforce by age and gender.
Dierences across genders are apparent, but relatively small. When averaged across age groups,
the dierence between men and women is about 13% for either the ltered or cyclical hours worked
series. However, the dierences by age are stark. Again, the decreasing pattern by age exists for
both men and women, with the magnitude of volatility dierences roughly similar. For instance,
20-24 year olds experience hours volatility roughly 3 times greater than the prime-aged for both
genders. Evidently, the dierences across age groups within gender are more pronounced than the
dierences across genders within age group.
For disaggregation by age and educational attainment, the results remain. For brevity, we
present results only for two education groups: those with high school diplomas or less (labeled high
school and less), and those with at least some postsecondary education (more than high school).5
5Given the small fraction of teenagers with postsecondary education, we omit them from this analysis.
6Table 3: Volatility of Hours Worked by Age and Education, U.S.
20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64
ltered volatility
high school and less 2.362 1.942 1.574 1.061 1.172 1.847
more than high school 2.228 1.257 0.692 0.734 0.814 1.764
cyclical volatility
high school and less 2.106 1.739 1.467 0.920 0.894 0.973
more than high school 1.694 1.026 0.532 0.526 0.331 0.515
Note: Data from the March CPS, 1968-2005. Filtered volatility is the percentage standard devia-
tion of HP-ltered log data. Cyclical volatility is the percentage standard deviation of HP-ltered
log data as projected on aggregate business cycle measures.
There is a noticeable dierence in the volatility of hours by education. But more interestingly, the
dierences across education are much less pronounced for young workers than for the prime-aged. A
simple average across 20-24 and 25-29 year olds indicates that those with less education have hours
volatility that is 1.5 times that of those with more, implying that young workers experience greater
than average volatility, regardless of education. By contrast, the dierence across education groups
is a factor of 2.5 for the prime-aged, those aged 40-59. Finally, note that large dierences by age
remain for both education groups. For instance, 20-24 year olds experience hours volatility 2.5 to
3 times greater than 40-49 year olds, regardless of educational attainment. Indeed, 20-29 year olds
with more education have greater volatility than prime-age workers with less education! Hence, as
in Gomme, Rogerson, Rupert, and Wright (2004) and Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2008), we focus
on age-level heterogeneity as the primary demographic factor in understanding the volatility of
aggregate hours worked.6
2.2 Age-Specic Unemployment
Additional evidence on the dierences in business cycle sensitivity across age groups is presented
in Figure 1. Here we present the average response of unemployment to a postwar U.S. recession,
6Gomme, Rogerson, Rupert, and Wright (2004) discuss age dierences with further demographic breakdowns (e.g.,
marital status, industry of occupation) for the U.S. They nd that essentially none of the age dierences in volatility
are due to dierences in the distribution of hours worked across industries. This nding (along with our desire to
maintain comparability to the standard RBC model) motivates our investigation of a one-sector model in Section 4.







































































Notes: Data from BLS, 1948:I-2004:II. Dynamic behavior of age-specic unemployment rates
over a recession. Solid line represents unemployment rate response, averaged over NBER dened
recessions. Dotted line represents two-standard-error band. Date 0 represents onset of recession,
as identied by NBER.
where recessions are those identied by the NBER.7 The unemployment rate data come from the
BLS, cover the period 1948:I-2004:II, and are available for the age groups presented. Along the
horizontal axis, date 0 represents the rst quarter of a recession. The gure tracks the ltered age-
specic unemployment rates for 20 quarters beyond this date. The solid blue line represents the
recessionary response averaged across episodes, while the dashed red lines represent two-standard-
error bands around the average for each variable. Unemployment rates for all age groups rise
quickly in response to a recession, crossing above trend at date 0, then peaking at date 4 or 5
before slowly returning to trend.
Magnitudes of the recessionary response, however, dier across age groups. The peak response
of unemployment is much stronger for young individuals. While the unemployment rate of 16-19
and 20-24 year olds increases by 1.5% above trend, the increase is only about 0.6% for prime-aged
7See also Nagyp al (2004) who provides an analysis of age group dierences during recessionary episodes.
8workers. Indeed, the peak responses of these two age groups are well outside of the 2 standard
deviation bands of all the other age groups.
Moreover, the 16-19 and 20-24 age groups experience average trough-to-peak responses of ap-
proximately 2.4% about the trend. This compares with a trough-to-peak response of only 1.2%
for prime-aged individuals. In summary, the unemployment rate of young workers responds to
recessions roughly twice as much as that of prime-aged workers.
3 Distinguishing Among Mechanisms
As stated in the Introduction, many potential mechanisms may account for the observed age group
dierences in hours and employment volatility. In this section, we present empirical evidence that
guides the approach taken in this paper.
To focus discussion, we rst consider analyses based on spot market determination of hours
and wages in the labor market, as in the RBC model. In such a framework, age group dierences
can arise from dierences in the cyclical characteristics of labor demand or labor supply. The
premise of Section 3.1 is that an analysis of real wages can be used to dierentiate between these
two mechanisms. The relative cyclicality of age-specic wages, taken together with the facts from
Section 2, indicates an important role for age group dierences in cyclical labor demand.
In Section 3.2, we present a variance decomposition of age-specic hours worked. We argue that
this decomposition is evidence against dierent labor force participation decisions being the sole or
primary factor in determining age dierences in hours volatility. Finally, in Section 3.3, we consider
a relaxation of the assumption of spot markets for labor. In particular, we consider a specic
hypothesis regarding age dierences owing to the long-term nature of employment relationships.
Evidence based on an intersectoral analysis of hours worked volatility does not support this view
as being of primary importance.
3.1 Age-Specic Wages
From the March CPS, we use information on labor income and hours worked to construct annual
time series for wage rates for the period 1963 through 2005. Given our interest in wage cyclicality,
we construct wage rates in a way mitigating composition eects stemming from labor heterogeneity.
9Table 4: Volatility of Real Hourly Wages by Age Group, U.S.
15-19 20-24 25-29 35-39 45-49 55-59 60-64
ltered volatility 2.87 1.59 1.27 1.09 1.19 1.53 1.64
R2 0.35 0.28 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.14
cyclical volatility 1.69 0.84 0.61 0.46 0.44 0.54 0.61
Notes: Data from the March CPS, 1963-2005. Filtered volatility is the percentage standard
deviation of HP-ltered log data. Cyclical volatility is the percentage standard deviation of HP-
ltered log data as projected on aggregate business cycle measures, with the R2 from this projection
reported.
Specically, we classify individuals into 220 highly disaggregated demographic groups, and weight
observations to derive eciency measures of labor input per age group for the computation of
wages. Our procedure is an extension of that used by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Krusell,
Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), and is detailed in Appendix A.6.8 We then HP-lter
these series to isolate uctuations at the business cycle frequency.
The rst row in Table 4 reports the percent standard deviation of the HP-ltered hourly real
wage rates by age. Again, to mitigate composition eects due to heterogeneity, we compute real
wage rates for 5 year age groups, as opposed to the 10 year age groups presented in the previous
section. We see a decreasing pattern in volatility by age with an upturn beginning in the 55-59
age group. The second row reports the R2 from projecting the age-specic series onto detrended
aggregate output and hours, as done in Section 2.1. These statistics indicate that real wages, when
disaggregated by age, are indeed mildly procyclical. Row 3 presents the percent standard deviation
of the cyclical age-specic series. As in Row 1, we see the familiar decreasing pattern of volatility
by age, with a slight upturn at the end of the age distribution. For instance, the standard deviation
of cyclical volatility for 20-24 year olds about twice that of 45-49 year olds.9
If dierences in labor supply were the sole factor responsible for the greater volatility of young
8Using weekly wages, as in Katz and Murphy (1992), yields the similar results to the ones we report here for
hourly wages.
9Finally, we note that this pattern of cyclicality in age-specic wages is robust to further disaggregation by
education and gender, but are not presented here for brevity.
10workers' hours than the prime-aged, their wages would simultaneously be less volatile over the
business cycle. We provide a detailed demonstration of this in Section 4 and Appendix A.3.
By contrast, we nd exactly the opposite. The greater cyclical volatility of wages for the young
displayed here, in conjunction with their greater volatility in hours worked, indicates that there
must be some role played by dierences in the cyclical nature of labor demand.10 This nding is
laid out in detail in Section 4.
3.2 Variance Decomposition of Hours Worked
Changes in per capita hours worked can be viewed as due to changes in either hours per labor
force participant, or the number of the labor force participants per capita. We refer to the former
as the hours margin, and to the latter as the participation margin. The relative contribution of
each of these margins to the volatility of hours over the cycle is important in guiding our modeling
approach. If the participation margin is the main driver of hours variation then one could argue the
practical necessity of explicitly modeling a labor force participation decision.11 Otherwise, it would
indicate that to a rst-order approximation, the primary factor generating age group dierences
are to be found elsewhere. We hence consider in Table 5 the decomposition of the variance of hours
worked into the hours and participation margins.
Table 5 shows the proportion of hours variation by age group that can be attributed to the
participation margin. The rst row, using HP-ltered data, presents the ratio of the variance
owing to the participation margin to the sum of the variances of the hours margin and participation
margin. For those at or near retirement age, the participation decision appears to be an important
source of variance in their hours worked. However, for all others, the bulk of the hours variation
is due to variation in hours per labor force member. Specically, for 20-59 year old individuals,
the participation margin accounts for no more than 14% of hours variation. For teenagers, this is
higher at 27%; nonetheless, nearly three quarters of the variance of teenaged hours worked is due
to the hours margin.
10Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) make the related point on the relative procyclicality of hours and wages between
men and women.
11For example, young individuals potentially face dierent trade-os between market work and other activities
(opportunities for educational attainment, home production, and leisure that may not be available to older-aged
individuals).
11Table 5: Hours Decomposition, Participation Margin




27.28 8.87 7.84 6.83 8.97 14.00 48.00
covariance
included (%)




24.26 4.39 1.96 1.43 0.40 2.41 1.69
covariance
included (%)
35.87 15.89 7.34 7.85 2.12 10.61 4.94
Notes: Data from the March CPS, 1968-2005. Shown are percentage shares of total hours variation
attributed to the participation margin. Total hours per age group member is the product two
variables: labor force participation per age group, and hours per labor force participant in that age
group. \Covariance not included" means covariance terms are ignored, so total variation is just the
sum of the variables' variances and the share attributed to the participation margin is the variance of
labor force participation. \Covariance included" means total variation includes covariance terms,
so total variation is the sum of the variables' variances plus two times their covariance and the
share attributed to the participation margin is the variance of labor force participation plus the
covariance. Filtered volatility is the standard deviation of HP-ltered log data. Cyclical volatility
is the standard deviation of HP-ltered log data as projected on aggregate business cycle measures.
12The second row presents an alternative decomposition which accounts for the covariance between
hours per labor force member and labor force members per capita. Specically, the participation
margin's share is now dened as its variance plus the covariance, divided by the total variance of
hours worked. Row 2 presents a similar picture to Row 1. The participation still gures heavily
into the variance of hours for those over 60. For all others, the participation margin is much less
important than the hours margin.
The third and fourth rows present the same information as Rows 1 and 2, respectively, now
isolating the business cycle component of hours per labor force member and labor force partici-
pation.12 Focusing on uctuations that are correlated with the cycle tells a similar story: with
covariance terms not included, the participation margin explains less than 25% of the variation
of any age group. With the inclusion of covariance terms, participation explains at most 35% of
the variation for the 15-19 year olds; uctuations in hours per labor force participant continue to
account for the bulk of the variation in per capita hours over the business cycle for all age groups.13
3.3 Seniority Rules and Young Workers
The analysis thus far has pointed to the importance of modeling labor demand over the cycle in
accounting for age dierences in volatility. This is based principally on observed dierences in
the cyclicality of age-specic wages; this in turn relies on a spot market view of labor market
transactions. In reality, the institutional features of labor markets are more complex than those
posited in the RBC literature, and it can be argued that this complexity partially accounts for age
dierences in hours volatility.
Specically, in reality workers and rms engage in multi-period relationships, in contrast to
the period-by-period transactions typically considered in RBC models. As the data on age-specic
hours suggests, older workers have more permanent work situations that young workers. This may
be due to the nature of the production process { the existence of organizational capital, rm know-
how, or operational knowledge { which, in and of itself, is not incompatible with our emphasis on
12Again, this is calculated as a projection on a constant, current detrended aggregate output, and current and
lagged detrended aggregate hours.
13The portion of cyclical volatility for the 60+ year olds is noticeably lower than for ltered volatility; this comes
from the low R
2 of these business cycle projections for these age groups' labor force participation decisions.
13capital-experience complementarity. That is, capital-experience may be responsible for both the
dierences in the existence of long-term relationships for old and young workers, and the dierences
in hours volatility. On the other hand, dierences in the permanency of work tenure across age may
be driven by institutional features, like labor market policies or social norms, that are independent
of considerations owing to the nature of production. Hence, seniority rules or \last-in/rst-out"
(LIFO) rules may constitute an independent force for age group dierences in hours volatility over
the cycle.14 We have conducted a preliminary analysis of the importance of such institutional
features, using data disaggregated at the sectoral level. We nd no evidence for seniority or LIFO
rules as a primary factor explaining age dierences in volatility. For brevity, we present our analysis
in Appendix A.2.
4 The Model
In this section, we present a model in which production technology displays capital-experience
complementarity. The remaining features of the model { in particular, household preferences { are
specied to conform as closely as possible to the standard RBC model. This is not to claim that
other mechanisms, such as life-cycle labor supply considerations, are irrelevant for understanding
age dierences in hours volatility. Instead, this specication allows us to isolate the role of cyclical
dierences in labor demand by age in accounting for the facts presented in Sections 2.1 and 3.
4.1 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical, innitely-lived households. Each house-
hold is composed of a unit mass of family members. For simplicity, we assume there are only
two types of family members, young and old. Let sY denote the share of family members that
are young. Family members derive instantaneous utility from consumption Ci and disutility from
hours spent working Ni, according to Ui (Ci;Ni), where i 2 fY;Og denotes either young or old.




t j [sY UY (CY t;NY t) + (1   sY )UO (COt;NOt)]; (4.1)
14We thank Valerie Ramey for encouraging us to investigate this mechanism.
14subject to
sY CY j + (1   sY )COj + ~ Kj+1 = (1   ) ~ Kj + rj ~ Kj + sY WY jNY j + (1   sY )WOjNOj; 8j  t;
with 0 <  < 1, 0    1. Here ~ Kt denotes capital holdings at date t, rt is the rental rate, WY t is
the wage rate of young workers, and WOt is the wage rate of old workers. The household takes all
prices as given. In our benchmark case, we specify the instantaneous utility function to be
UY = logCY    Y N
1+Y
Y =(1 + Y ); UO = logCO    ON
1+O
O =(1 + O):
The parameters Y ;O  0 govern the Frisch labor supply elasticity, while  Y ; O > 0 are used to
calibrate the steady state values of NY and NO. We normalize the time endowment of all family
members to unity, so that 0  NY t;NOt  1.15
Because of additive separability in preferences, optimality entails equating consumption across
all family members:
CY t = COt = Ct: (4.2)





t+1(rt+1 + 1   )

:
The FONCs for hours worked are given by:
WY t =  Y CtN
Y
Y t ;
WOt =  OCtN
O
Ot :
Condition (4.2) implies that the income eect of a consumption change on labor supply is equal
across young and old workers. In our benchmark calibration, we set Y = O so that the substitution
eect of wage changes on labor supply is equated across workers. Adopting identical income and
substitution eects allows us to isolate the role of capital-experience complementarity in generating
volatility dierences across young and old workers.
15Francis and Ramey (2008) use a variant of this utility function to study how demographic shifts lead to low
frequency movements in hours worked and productivity.
154.2 Firms
Production exhibits capital-experience complementarity. Final goods are produced by perfectly
competitive rms using capital, experienced labor, and inexperienced labor as inputs. We as-
sume that an individual's age directly determines his or her labor market experience, so that all





 + (1   )[K






 ; ; < 1: (4.3)
Here HY t is labor input of young (or inexperienced) workers, HOt is labor input of old (or experi-
enced) workers, and Kt is capital services hired at date t. Labor-augmenting technology follows a
deterministic growth trend with stationary shocks:
At = exp(gt + zt);
zt = zt 1 + "t; 0 <  < 1;
where E (") = 0, 0  var(") = 2
" < 1, and g > 0 is the trend growth rate of technology.
The elasticity of substitution between old workers and capital is given by (1   )
 1, while the
elasticity of substitution between young workers and the HO-K composite is (1   )
 1. Follow-
ing Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), we dene production as exhibiting capital-
experience complementarity when  > .
Firms hire inputs from perfectly competitive factor markets to maximize prots:
t  Yt   rtKt   WY tHY t   WOtHOt:
Optimality entails equating factor prices with marginal revenue products:
rt = Y 1 
t (1   )[K







WOt = Y 1 
t (1   )[K

t + (1   )(AtHOt)
]
 










Equilibrium is dened as follows. Given ~ K0 > 0 and the stochastic process, fztg, a competitive
equilibrium is an allocation, fCt; NY t; NOt; ~ Kt+1; Yt; HY t; HOt; Ktg, and a price system, fWY t;
WOt; rtg, such that: given prices, the allocation solves both the representative household's problem
and the representative rm's problem for all t; and factor markets clear for all t:
Kt = ~ Kt; HY t = sY NY t; HOt = (1   sY )NOt:
Walras' law ensures clearing in the nal goods market:
Ct + Kt+1 = Yt + (1   )Kt; 8t:
Finally, for the purposes of model evaluation, we dene aggregate hours worked as Ht = sY HY t +
(1   sY )HOt.
4.4 The Eects of Capital-Experience Complementarity
In this subsection, we provide analytical results regarding the relative cyclicality of hours worked
and real wages for young and old agents. To begin, we show that when production displays capital-
experience complementarity, the response of young hours to a technology shock is greater than that
of the old; this result holds even when there are no dierences in labor supply characteristics.
Proposition 1 Let Y = O  0 and  > . The response of hours of young workers to a business
cycle shock is greater than the response of hours of old workers.
The proof is contained in Appendix A.4. Here, we demonstrate this result for the special case in
which  = 0. When  = 0, the HO-K composite becomes Cobb-Douglas, and the rm's FONCs
simplify as:











In logW - logH space, these dene linear labor demand curves, with slope (   1) for young
labor and slope [(1   )   1] for old. Since 0 <  < 1, and 0 <  < 1 (recall that capital-
experience complementarity is dened as  > , and we have assumed  = 0), the demand curve
17for young labor is atter than that of old labor. Moreover, a shock to technology (a change in
logA) generates a vertical shift in the young labor demand curve of , which is larger than the
shift in the old labor demand curve of (1   ). These two factors combine to generate the result
of Proposition 1.
We show this diagrammatically in Figure 2. The left panel depicts the demand curve for young
labor, the right panel for old labor. In each panel, the horizontal line depicts the labor supply curves
derived from the household's FONCs with Rogerson-Hansen preferences and lotteries; in log-log
space, both are linear with common slope, Y = O = 0. This restriction is made for graphical
simplicity and is relaxed in Figure 3; as indicated in the proposition, the result is independent of
the (common) slope of the labor supply curves.
Using a circumex to denote log deviations, consider a positive shock to technology, ^ A. In
equilibrium, the positive income eect of this shock generates an upward shift in the labor supply
curves; since our model assumes identical wealth eects across agents, we abstract from these shifts
in the diagram for the sake of clarity. The technology shock also results in an equilibrium output
response, ^ Y ; since the eect of this response is identical across labor demand curves, we abstract
from these in the diagram as well. Finally, note that capital is a state variable, so that the response
of capital to the shock is ^ K = 0.
Hence, the only eect that requires diagrammatic consideration is the direct eect of the shock
to the labor demand curves, and we plot these in the middle and bottom rows of Figure 2. Suppose,
momentarily, that the technology shock results in identical shifts in the two demand curves: this
is illustrated as the dotted lines in the middle row. As is geometrically obvious, this results in a
larger equilibrium response of young labor input relative to the old, i.e. ^ HY > ^ HO. This is due to
the relative complementarity of old labor to capital, implying that the marginal revenue product
of labor is more sensitive to changes in labor for HO relative to HY . After a positive shift in
labor demand, a smaller change in old labor is required to achieve the same change in its marginal
revenue product, and we call this the relative slope eect.
But note that the positive shock actually generates a larger vertical shift in the demand for
HY than for HO:  ^ A > (1   ) ^ A. That is, the shock has a larger direct eect on the marginal
18Figure 2: Labor Supply and Demand Diagrams 1
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Notes { All panels: Red lines labeled \S" depict the labor supply curves derived from the
household's FONCs with Rogerson-Hansen preferences in log-log space with common slope Y =
O = 0; blue lines labeled \D" depict labor demand curves. Top panel: slope of demand curve for
HY is atter than the demand curve for HO. Middle panel: we abstract from the wealth eects
of a productivity shock on the labor supply since they are identical across young and old; the shock
causes both demand curves to shift up; the \relative slope" eect is evident in %HY > %HO.
Bottom panel: the \relative shift" eect is evident from the labor demand for HY shifting up by
more than for HO, increasing %HY even more.
19revenue product of young labor. This is depicted by the dash-dot line in the left panel of the bottom
row. This additional relative shift eect reinforces the relative slope eect. Hence, in equilibrium,
^ HY > ^ HO.
For the extreme case with innite Frisch labor supply elasticities (Y = O = 0) displayed, the
equilibrium wage response is equated across young and old labor. However, for the more general
case of positive Frisch elasticity (Y = O > 0), the response of the young wage to a technology
shock will be greater than that of the old wage with capital-experience complementarity. This is
illustrated in the top row of Figure 3. The young and old labor supply curves exhibit identical (less
than innite) Frisch elasticities. With capital-experience complementarity, a shock to technology
simultaneously generates a larger hours and wage response of the young as compared to the old.
Analytically, this can be derived from the household's FONCs with respect to labor supply.
Using the fact that consumption is equated across agents:
WY t= Y N
Y
Y t = WOt= ON
O
Ot :
Substituting in the labor market clearing conditions, this can be rewritten in terms of log deviations
as
^ WY   ^ WO = Y ^ HY   O ^ HO:
When Y = O > 0, ^ WY > ^ WO follows directly when ^ HY > ^ HO, as is the case with capital-
experience complementarity. The intuition for this is straightforward: when agents have identical
labor supply curves, the only way to induce a greater hours response for young workers is through
a larger wage response.
Note, however, that this condition implies a stronger result. With capital-experience comple-
mentarity, the wage response of young workers can be greater than that of the old, even when young
labor supply is more elastic (i.e. when Y < O). We view this as an important result, since our
point is not to claim that labor supply characteristics are identical across all agents. Indeed, the
Frisch elasticity of young workers may be greater, or the income eect of consumption changes for
young workers may be smaller, or both, relative to the old. The mechanism embodied in capital-
experience complementarity is still capable of jointly delivering greater cyclical volatility of hours
and wages for the young relative to the old.






















Notes { All panels: Red lines labeled \S" depict the labor supply curves derived from the
household's FONCs in log-log space; blue lines labeled \D" depict labor demand curves. Top
panel: supply curves with common slope Y = O 6= 0 and demand curves with capital-experience
complementarity. Bottom panel: demand curves without capital-experience complementarity
while the supply curve for HY is more elastic than the supply curve for HO in order to match the
larger %HY .
21On the other hand, assume there is no capital-experience complementarity, so that there are
no dierences in the response of labor demand to a technology shock. As we discuss formally in
Appendix A.3, and demonstrate graphically in the bottom row of Figure 3, then one must assume
that the Frisch labor supply elasticity of the young is higher than that of the old in order to match
the fact that ^ HY is more responsive to shocks than ^ HO. However, in this case with identical labor
demand characteristics, such a model cannot match the fact that ^ WY is more responsive than ^ WO.
This has been made obvious in the bottom row of Figure 3, where the labor supply curve of the
young has been illustrated as being perfectly elastic. More generally, as long as labor supply is
more elastic for the young relative to the old, the wage response of the young will be smaller in
response to identical labor demand uctuations. Hence, matching both the higher relative volatility
of young hours and young wages requires a model where labor demand shocks are not age neutral.
5 Quantitative Specication
In this section, we describe the quantitative specication used for evaluating the model. To maintain
comparability with the RBC literature, we adopt a standard calibration when possible. However,
the model's parameters governing elasticities of substitution in production,  and , cannot be
calibrated to match standard rst moments in the U.S. data. Instead, we adopt a structural
estimation procedure to identify these values using data from the NIPA and CPS. After describing
the procedure, we discuss calibration of the remaining parameter values. Given the evidence in the
previous sections, we classify 15-29 year olds as young and 30-64 year olds as old.
5.1 Structural Estimation
Our strategy entails estimating  and  from the model's factor demand equations.16 Consider the
rm's FONC with respect to the demand for HY t rewritten in logged, rst-dierenced form:
logWY t = a0 + (   1)log(HY t=Yt) + ut; (5.1)
where a0 is a constant, and ut is a function of current and lagged shock innovations
ut = "t   (1   )
 
"t 1 + "t 2 + 2"t 3 + :::

:
16A similar approach is used in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1995) and the references therein.
22Hence,  is identied from the response of WY to exogenous changes in HY and Y .
The age-specic wage measures analyzed in Section 3.1 are constructed using hours data in order
to translate direct information on labor income into information on hourly wages, similar to Krusell,
Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000)'s hourly wage and Katz and Murphy (1992)'s weekly wage
constructions. To avoid problems stemming from using WY t, which is partly constructed from HY t,
in our regression, we estimate a variant of (5.1) for which direct data on the left-hand side variable
is available.17 This is obtained by multiplying both sides of the FONC by HY t
logLIY t = a1 + logHY t + (1   )logYt + ut; (5.2)
where LIY t  WY tHY t denotes labor income earned by young workers, for which data is available
directly from the CPS. If there were no endogeneity issues (see below),  could be estimated from
a simple restricted least-squares regression.
To estimate , we proceed in a similar manner. Combining the rm's FONCs with respect to
HOt and Kt and performing similar manipulations obtains
log(QOt=QKt) = a2 + log(HOt=Kt) + ut; (5.3)
where QOt denotes the share of national income earned by old labor, and QKt the share of national
income earned by capital.
Importantly, this procedure does not require imposing any restrictions from the model's spec-
ication of household behavior.18 The only assumptions required to pin down  and  are: (i)
prot maximization on the part of rms, and (ii) that changes in factor prices reect changes
in marginal revenue products. As is obvious from our estimating equations, (5.2) and (5.3), our
identication does not in any way use the fact that young hours are more volatile over the cycle
than old hours. Moreover, no aspect of our approach imposes that  > . Whether this condition
is satised depends on the relation between aggregate prices and quantities observed in the data.
17The data used in estimation come from standard sources. Briey, Yt, Kt, and QKt come from the BEA's NIPA
and Fixed Asset Tables. HY t, HOt, LIY t, and QOt are constructed using March CPS data. Because of this, our
data comprise annual observations for the period 1968 - 2005. See Appendix A.6 for a detailed discussion of the data
construction.
18We see this as a virtue since our goal is not to claim that labor supply characteristics are indeed identical across
the young and old, as maintained in our benchmark calibration. Instead, or goal is to isolate the quantitative role of
dierences in the cyclical demand for young and old labor.
235.1.1 Instruments
Since both of our estimating equations are based on the estimation of factor demand equations,
we need to address the endogeneity of the regressors to the error term. The structural equations
identify the error term as due to shocks to productivity. In order to obtain unbiased estimates more
generally, we must isolate variation in our regressors that is unrelated to shocks shifting rms' factor
demand, be they technology shocks or other omitted factors from the FONCs.
We do so by adopting an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Specically, we use two in-
struments: lagged birth rates and the Ramey and Shapiro (1998) dates indicating the onset of
exogenous military build-ups.19 In a standard RBC model like the one we consider, the introduc-
tion of exogenous government spending shocks introduces exogenous shifts in labor supply due to
the income eect of such shocks (see Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)). This results in changes
in HY , HO, and Y that are unrelated to shifts in factor demand.
Our second instrument is lagged birth rates. This instrument allows us again to identify changes
in current labor supply, this time due to changes in past fertility that are uncorrelated to shifts in
factor demand.20 Recall that
ut = "t   (1   )
 
"t 1 + "t 2 + 2"t 3 + :::

:
Lagged birth rates are valid if we assume that fertility is exogenous to past technology shock inno-
vations, f"t jg8j>0. If one believes that fertility decisions, say, 15 years ago might be endogenous
to innovations at least 15 years ago, then some bias might be induced with these instruments.
However, note that in the case of the 15-year lagged birth rate, the concern is its correlation with
the sum (1   )
P1
j=14 j"t j 1 in ut. For standard values of shock persistence, , relevant for
business cycle analysis, the impact of this is almost neligible. Obviously, for birthrates of larger
lag, this is even smaller. We thus conclude that, from an empirical standpoint, lagged birth rates
are valid instruments.
We obtain IV estimates of ^  = 0:59 and ^  = 0:01, with Newey-West standard errors of 0:22
19The estimates of  and  are identical if we use real government defense spending instead of the Ramey and
Shapiro (1998) dates. Similarly, instrumenting only with lagged birth rates does not alter our estimates.
20See also Beaudry and Green (2003) who use exogenous demographic variation as an instrument in production
function estimation.
24and 0:19, respectively.21 There is clear evidence for the relevance of our instruments from readily
available weak-instrument hypothesis tests. Anderson (1951) and Cragg and Donald (1993) test
the null that the instrumented regressors are under-identied due to the instruments' irrelevance:
we reject using either statistic in both (5.2) and (5.3) with p-values below 0.007 in all cases. Thus,
the data suggest that weak-instrument issues are not of concern.22
5.1.2 Specication Testing
Here, we provide additional evidence from a series of specication tests in favor of our model of
capital-experience complementarity. To do so, we maintain the following assumptions from our
benchmark model: (i) that nal output is produced using physical capital, K, old labor input, HO,
and young labor input, HY , and (ii) that the production function features a nested CES functional
form.
Our specication (4.3) posits that the innermost nesting is a CES composite of HO-K. But
more generally, the production function could alternatively feature an innermost nesting of HY -K
or HY -HO. Each of these specications generate dierent FONCs as estimating equations. These
equations dier in terms of dependent and independent variables, but maintain the same functional
forms. Our approach is to test for misspecication in these regressions in order to determine which
of these three alternatives the data rejects (if any).23
Before proceeding, we note that this testing approach may appear narrow in scope, particularly
due to our maintained assumption, (ii). We argue that this is not the case for two primary reasons.
First, virtually all quantitative macroeconomic models embody a high degree of log-linearity in
preferences and technology, and our nested CES production function is simply a generalization of
that. Secondly, our alternative specications for production allow for the possibility that labor
demand is symmetric across young and old labor. Specically, consider the specication:
Yt = 1 (Kt;At2 (HY t;HOt));
21Based on the autocorrelations of the residuals, we allow four lags in the kernel.
22 More informally, R
2s from the rst-stage regressions are 0.67, 0.42, and 0.18 for log(HO=K), log(HY ), and
log(Y ), respectively.
23For each of these dierent specications we change the regressors and instruments accordingly.
25where both 1 (:;:) and 2 (:;:) are CES functions in their two arguments.24 For this nesting, it is
easy to show that there is no dierence in the cyclical properties of labor demand across HY and HO;
see Appendix A.3 for details. Hence, our specication tests allow us to discern whether the data, in
fact, prefer a model featuring labor demand dierences due to capital-experience complementarity.
To this end, we perform the Ramsey (1969) test for model misspecication. In particular,
our model's production function, (4.3), delivers linear estimating equations, (5.2) and (5.3). The
alternative production function nestings deliver analogously linear pairs of FONCs for estimation.
As discussed in Davidson and MacKinnon (2004), the Ramsey test is a straightforward and powerful
method for testing the linear restrictions imposed in these regressions. The null hypothesis of the
test is that the linear estimating equations are correctly specied.
To summarize, the procedure amounts to a joint hypothesis test that coecients on non-linear
terms are equal to zero; this test statistic has an asymptotic 2(2) distribution (see Appendix A.5
for additional discussion). For our chosen HO-K nesting, the statistic equals 0.47 with p-value
0.79; we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no model misspecication. On the other hand, for the
alternative HY -K and HY -HO nestings this statistic takes the value 13.99 and 31.78 with associated
p-values 0.001 and 0.000, respectively. Hence, we nd clear evidence to reject the null hypothesis
that these estimating equations are correctly specied. We take this as evidence that the data
favors our specication embodying capital-experience complementarity.
5.2 Calibration
Given the estimated values for  and , the remaining parameters are calibrated as is standard,
with  = 0:99,  = 0:025. The only two \new" parameters are  and , the share parameters in our
production function (4.3). Following Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) we calibrate
these to match national income shares. Specically, in our model we set  and  to match the
1968-2005 national income shares of QK = 0:373 and QO = 0:494. With values for f^ ;^ ;;g and
data on output and factor inputs, we back out the implied technology series fAtg.25
24The standard RBC model's specication is a special case of this, where 2 is a linear function (so that young
and old labor are perfect substitutes) and 1 is Cobb-Douglas.
25We are calibrating a quarterly model, however up to now we have dealt with annual data measures. The reason
for this is that quarterly data on age-specic hours do not begin until 1976. We do have semiannual data on age-
specic hours from 1968-2005 (constructed by the authors from the March CPS and the October CPS surveys held by







std(H)/std(Y ) 0.97 0.92 0.89
std(HY )/std(Y ) 1.48 1.55 1.41
std(HO)/std(Y ) 0.82 0.68 0.69
std(WY )/std(Y ) 0.35 0.26 0.32
std(WO)/std(Y ) 0.25 0.26 0.27
std(WY )/std(WO) 1.26 1.00 1.20
Notes { Column 1: HP ltered data from March CPS, 1968-2005. Column 2: Rogerson-Hansen
preferences, Y = O = 0. Column 3: O = 0, Y = 0:05 to match data on relative age-specic
wages.
6 Quantitative Evaluation
Column 1 in Table 6 presents statistics for HP-ltered U.S. data. As is well known, the volatility
of aggregate hours is almost identical to the volatility of output (the ratio of standard deviations
is 0:97). The remaining rows in Column 1 report the relative volatility of hours and wages for the
two age groups. While aggregate hours worked is as volatile as output, this masks large dierences
across the young and the old. The hours of the young are about 50% more volatile than output,
while the hours of the old are less volatile than output. As noted in Section 3.1, the volatility of
real wages is also greater for the young than for the old. For our 15-29 and 30-64 year old age
groups, the ratio of real wage volatility is 1:26.
We begin the quantitative evaluation of the model by setting Y = O = 0, so that utility is
linear in hours worked. This is a useful benchmark since the standard RBC model (with homoge-
nous labor and Cobb-Douglas production function) requires very high labor supply elasticity to
generate signicant volatility of hours. In particular, the indivisible labor model (with perfectly
NBER). From this data we see that the relevant time series display the same volatilities relative to output. Likewise,
the relative volatilities of young and old hours are the same in both the annual and semiannual time series. We
conclude that for these relationships the frequency of observation does not alter our results.
27elastic aggregate labor supply) generates a ratio of the standard deviation of hours to output of
approximately 0:7   0:75.26 In this sense, the volatility of aggregate hours worked represents a
puzzle to the RBC literature.
As Column 2 of Table 6 reports, the capital-experience complementarity model generates volatil-
ity of total hours that is very close to that observed in the data; the relative standard deviation
of aggregate hours to output is 0:92. The next two rows show that the key to this success lays in
the model's ability to generate a series of hours worked by the young that uctuates substantially
more than output and old hours over the business cycle. The model generates a volatility ratio
of 1:55 for young hours to output, which is slightly greater than the value of 1:48 observed in the
data. On the other hand, the model understates the volatility of old hours relative to output: the
relative standard deviation is 0:68, while this is 0:82 in the data. Our quantitative specication has
(essentially) unit elasticity of substitution between capital and old hours ( = 0:01), and innite
Frisch elasticity of labor supply for the old. These are the same features displayed by the homoge-
nous labor input in the standard RBC model with indivisible labor, discussed in the preceding
paragraph. Thus the capital-experience complementarity model generates a relative volatility of
old hours to output similar to the relative volatility of aggregate hours to output in the standard
RBC model.
Finally, while the benchmark calibration is successful with respect to the hours dimension, it
cannot account for the behavior of relative wages between the young and the old. This is not a
surprise since we have innite Frisch labor supply elasticity for both family members; in Section
4.4, we showed that the volatility of age-specic wages would be identical for this case.
In Column 3 we consider the following modication: we change only the Frisch labor supply
elasticity of the young to match the relative wage volatility. This requires a minimal change, moving
Y from 0 to 0:05. The model now generates greater volatility in the wage of young labor compared
to old labor, as observed in the U.S. Moreover, the model generates volatility of age-specic wages
relative to output that is also close to those found in the data.27 Not surprisingly, lower elasticity
26See for example, Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988), King and Rebelo (1999).
27Note that we are reporting the volatility for cyclical uctuations in real wages, as constructed in Section 3.1. As
previously shown, a signicant portion of high frequency wage variation is not correlated with the cycle. Given the
focus on business cyle uctuations in hours and wages, we concentrate on the variation in wages that is due to the
28of young labor supply induces a fall in the volatility of young hours, and hence, aggregate hours
relative to output. However, the fall is quantitatively small, and the values for std(H)=std(Y ) and
std(HY )=std(Y ) are still very similar to those found in the data. It is interesting to note that, as
in the case with Y = O = 0, the larger discrepancy between model and data is in matching the
relative volatility of old hours worked to output, and not in matching the much greater volatility
of hours worked by the young.
In sum, we see that the simulated model generates age-specic hours volatilities that are similar
to those observed in the data. As a by-product of this success, the model generates volatility of
aggregate hours that is very close to that of aggregate output. Moreover, the model accounts for
the joint behavior of age-specic hours and wages.
7 Conclusion
We have presented an RBC model displaying capital-experience complementarity in production.
This is motivated by our investigation of the joint behavior of age-specic hours and wages. Young
individuals' hours and wages are more volatile over the business cycle than those of old individuals.
Within an RBC framework, dierences in the cyclical characteristics of age-specic labor demand
can explain this fact, while dierences in labor supply characteristics on their own cannot. We
view our model as a straightforward and parsimonious extension to the standard RBC model that
allows for such a dierence in labor demand. We estimate the key structural parameters governing
the degree of capital-experience complementarity, in a manner that does not target the observed
dierence in the volatility of hours.
Our quantitative model is able to match the relative volatility of age-specic hours to output.
As a result, it is also able to replicate the relative volatility of aggregate hours with respect to
output. Hence, capital-experience complementarity in production provides a solution to the long
standing hours volatility puzzle in the RBC literature.
cycle.
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31A Appendix
A.1 Hours Variance Decomposition
In this subsection, we provide a decomposition of the volatility of hours worked into its primary
components. Our view is that such a decomposition provides preliminary evidence on the relative
importance of labor supply and labor demand factors in understanding dierences in volatility
across age groups. This type of analysis is informative with respect to the structural model we
pursue. For example, dierences owing to life-cycle considerations would plausibly attribute a
greater proportion of the volatility of hours to volatility in labor force participation among some
age groups as compared to others. Schooling decisions might be a margin of adjustment which is
more relevant for young agents than to those in their prime-age. Similarly, the decision to re-enter
or drop out of the labor force over the business cycle might be more relevant for those above the
retirement age than others.
Note that hours worked per member of an age group (H) can be written as the following
product:
H = h  lf;
where h is hours per labor force participant and lf is labor force participant per age-group member.
Hence, changes in H can be due to changes in these terms, which we refer to as the \hours margin"
and the \participation margin," respectively. As such we decompose the variance of hours worked













+ 2  cov

^ h;l ^ f

(A.1)
where ^ H denotes deviations of the log of H from its HP-ltered trend, and similarly for the other




is to see how inuential is the participation margin,
which we do not model, relative to the hours margin, which we do model.
The goal of simply accounting for the participation margin does not tell us how to attribute
the covariance terms in (A.1) and so we do the following. For one set of calculations, we ignore













We denote these results \covariance not included."
For the other set of calculations, we include covariance. Moreover, we take a equitable stance
towards the participation margin and attribute to it half of the covariance term including l ^ f. Here













using (A.1). We denote these results \covariance included."
As discussed in the text, the picture that emerges here is that the participation margin is less
inuential than the hours margins we model for all age groups.
28See Hansen (1985) for a similar decomposition.
32Figure 4: Major Industry Unionization Rates and Young/Old Hours Relative Volatility




























Notes: Unionization rate data available from BLS for 1983-2005, major industries as dened by
BLS supersectors. Hours data from March CPS, 1983-2005. Relative volatility is ratio of standard
deviation of 15-29 year old hours to standard deviation of 30-59 year old hours.
A.2 Seniority Rules and Young Workers
We test the potential importance of such institutional features by looking at the relationship be-
tween intersectoral unionization rates and age-specic hours worked volatility. Specically, we
assume all labor unions place an emphasis on the concerns of its (employed) members, and either
implicitly or explicitly endorse LIFO rules in employment decisions. To the extent that dier-
ent industries and sectors feature dierent rates of unionization, we should expect variation in
the importance of LIFO eects. To test this, we look at the volatility of young workers' hours
worked relative to that of the prime-aged over the cycle. Since seniority is highly-correlated with
age, we should expect that the quantitative importance of LIFO rules will obtain in age group
comparisons.29
We disaggregate hours worked by age and nine BLS-dened nonfarm \supersectors," which
roughly correspond to 1-digit level SIC codes. We obtain unionization rate data from the BLS
starting in 1983. In Figure 4, we present the scatterplot of the ratio of cyclical volatility of 15-29
year olds relative to 30-64 year olds to unionization, 1983-2005. The unionization rate measure is
the average rate observed over the sample period. This serves as a useful summary statistic since
unionization rates have been relatively stable since 1983, and importantly, the ordinal ranking
across supersectors has not changed.
We see that there is no evidence that more highly unionized sectors feature greater relative
volatility of the young. Performing a simple OLS regression obtains an R2 = 0:04 and a positive
slope estimate that is not close to being statistically signicant. As such, we do not nd prima
facie evidence for the importance of seniority or LIFO rules in explaining age dierences in hours
29Note that we implicitly assume that the unionization rate is exogenous to the relative volatility between the
young and prime-aged workers. We do not assume that it is exogenous to the level of total volatility of the sector.
33and employment volatility.
A.3 Labor Supply Models
As discussed in the introduction, in order to maintain comparability with the literature, we are
interested in a model that represents a minimal deviation from the standard RBC model. We begin
by analyzing two simple models based on labor supply dierences. As expected from the previous
discussion, while these models can account for the dierences in the cyclicality of age-specic
hours, they have counterfactual implications regarding the cyclicality of age-specic wages. We
then conclude that within the RBC framework, labor demand dierences are crucial for matching
dierences in the cyclicality of age-specic wages and analyze such a model in the following Section.
Dierences in Labor Supply: Model I In the rst model we consider we assume that





Here Ht is the aggregate labor input in the economy and it satises
Ht = HY t + EHOt
That is, the aggregate labor input is the sum of the hours of the young, HY t, and the hours of the
old, HOt. The parameter E allows for a dierence in the eciency of hours supplied between the
young and the old. The rest of the model is identical to the one we consider in the paper.
In this enviorment we have








From the FOC of the household we get




Thus, if Y < O, i.e., the Frisch labor supply elasticity of the young is higher then that of the old
(recall that the Frisch labor supply elasticity equals 1
), then the model can match V ar( ^ NY t) >
V ar( ^ NOt). However, from (A.2) and (A.3) it follows that by construction the relative volatility
of wages equals one in this model. Thus, this model cannot account for the joint behavior of age
specic hours and age specic relative wages that is observed in the U.S. data.
Dierences in Labor Supply: Model II We maintain the same assumptions regarding the










34Note that in this version we allow for the labor input of the young and the old to dier. However,
we assume that both of these inputs have the same elasticity of substitution with capital. Given
this production function we get that








Using the prices determined in (A.5)-(A.6) and the fact that HY t = sY NY t and HOt = (1   sY )NOt
we get
(1   )(1   )















Log-linearizing the ratio of these two equations it follows that
^ NY t =
(1 + O)
(1 + Y )
^ NOt (A.9)
Similarly to the previous model we have considered, the case of Y = O implies the volatility of
hours worked is identical for the young and the old. The only case in which V ar( ^ NY t) > V ar( ^ NOt)
is if
(1+O)
(1+Y ) > 1 { i.e. Y < O: However, from the labor supply equations it follows
^ WY t   ^ WOt = Y ^ NY t   O ^ NOt;
and thus






Since we are interested in calibrations where Y < O, it follows that ^ WY t < ^ WOt. The immediate
implication is that the uctuations in the wage of the young are smaller then the uctuations in
the wage of the old.30
To conclude this section; The two models based on \labor supply" dierences can easily match
the relative volatility of age specic hours. The rst model can also match the relative volatilities
of young and old hours to output. However, it is inherent to the models' mechanisms that they
have counterfactual implications regarding the volatility of age specic wages. These results lead
us to consider a \Labor-Demand" channel.
A.4 Proofs
The method of proof follows the arguments made in the text. Assume  > , so that production
exhibits capital-experience complementarity. The rm's FONCs written in log deviation form are:
^ WY = (1   )^ Y +  ^ A + (   1) ^ HY ;
30This is true as long as the two wages correlate positively.





^ X +  ^ A + (   1) ^ HO:






( ^ A + ^ HO)  X2( ^ A + ^ HO):
We have used the fact that ^ K = 0 in the impact period of a shock. Note that 0 < X2 < 1. Hence:
^ WO = (1   )^ Y + [(   )X2 + ] ^ A + [(   )X2 +    1] ^ HO:
Assuming Y = O = , the household's FONCs in log deviation form are:
 ^ HY = ^ WY   ^ C;
 ^ HO = ^ WO   ^ C;
so that:
 ^ HY   ^ WY =  ^ HO   ^ WO:




 + 1      (   )X2
 + 1   
+
(   )(1   X2)




The rst term on the right-hand side of the equality is greater than one since  > . Moreover, since
0 < X2 < 1, the second term on the right-hand side is greater than zero. Hence, capital-experience
complementarity implies that ^ HY > ^ HO in response to a positive technology shock, ^ A > 0.
A.5 Specication Testing
If we rewrite the production function (4.3)
1 (HY ;2 (HO;K))
where  denotes a CES aggregator, we can see that the three considered specications are
1 (HY ;2 (HO;K))
1 (HO;2 (HY ;K))
1 (K;2 (HY ;HO))
which we label according to the pair of variables appearing in the innermost CES aggregator. From
the three rst order conditions for any one of these specications, we derive estimation equations.
For HO   K these equations are written out as (5.2) and (5.3); for HY   K the equations are
identical except obviously with O and Y subscripts interchanged. For HY   HO we estimate the
equations
log(QKt) = a1 +  log(Kt=Yt)
log(LIY t=LIOt) = a2 + log(HY t=HOt)
36Because the model's only shock drops out of these equations, theoretically we do not need to
estimate these equations using instruments; nonetheless, doing so ad hoc does not change the test
result.
To understand the Ramsey (1969) test, recall that the conditional expectation E(Y jX) is a
function f(X). Therefore we can express the conditional expectation as a Taylor expansion of
f. Let that expansion be around the linear prediction of Y , call it Xb; a linear prediction of the
left-hand side variable is what estimating equations provide. Of course, the function f itself is
linear if all its higher order (second and beyond) derivatives are zero: said another way, f is not
linear if there is a nonzero coecient on a higher order expansion term. We look for evidence of
higher order expansion terms by regressing the residuals on higher powers of the regression tted
values; in practice one can restrict consideration to low powers of the tted values as suggested by
Davidson and MacKinnon (2004).
For any pair of estimation equations involving regressors X1 and X2, we run the seemingly
unrelated regressions of the residuals ^ u on tted values and tted values squared31
^ ut = i(Xibi) + i(Xibi)2 ; i 2 f1;2g
The specication test of the null hypothesis 1 = 2 = 0 has a 2(2) distribution and we report
this test statistic and p-value in the body of the paper.
A.6 Data
Data on hours, employment shares, and wages come from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
conducted by the Census Bureau. To obtain wage data, we use questions in the March CPS about
income obtained in the previous (last) year.32 In order to turn this income data into wage data,
we must know how many hours the individual worked last year. The hours for the previous year
are constructed as the number of weeks worked last year multiplied by a measure of how many
hours-per-week were worked by the individual last year. We follow Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and
Violante (2000) in imputing the hours-per-week from the data on how many hours the individual
worked in the previous (last) week.
Our measure of hours-per-week is dierent than Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante
(2000) in the following. We note whether the worker described her work last year as either full-
time (FT) or part-time (PT). Her last week's hours are imputed as the hours-per-week only if
the value falls within believable values, given that her work last year was either FT or PT. If
her previous week's hours are not consistent with FT or PT work, we impute a \disaggregated"
group average as the hours-per-week; by contrast, Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000)
impute a \disaggregated" group average only if the worker reported that she worked last year but
worked zero hours last week.
Our \disaggregated" groups are formed by dividing respondents by age, education, gender, and
last year's FT/PT status. Given that there are eleven 5-year age bins (15-19,20-24,...,60-64,65+),
5 eduction bins (below HS, HS, some college, college graduate, postgraduate work), 2 genders, and a
FT or PT status, there are 220 possible groups. Our \disaggregated" groups combine education bins
for some age-gender-FT/PT groups to ensure that for every year in 1964-2006 our \disaggregated"
groups each have at least fty members.33 This is done so that the \disaggregated" group average
31Higher powers of the tted values produce similar results and the same test results.
32As noted below, a specic question reporting wages only appears in the CPS survey starting in 1982.
33Additionally cutting by race (white/nonwhite) does not change matters much.
37is not overly reliant on only a few observations.
Conditional on the the other characteristics we consider, we use the information on PT and FT
as follows:
 If a person claims to be PT last year and works between 1 and 34 hours last week, we impute
their hours-per-week last year as their hours last week; otherwise (they worked 0 or more
than 34 hours last week) they are imputed the group average
 If a person claims to be FT last year and works 35 or more hours last week, we impute their
hours-per-week last year as their hours last week; otherwise (they worked 0-34 hours last
week) they are imputed the group average
Let g0 be the part of g with hours last week that are FT-status-tting for imputation purposes
(given the FT/PT nature of g), and g00 be those whose hours last week are not FT-status-tting.
Let hi, mi, yi, and i be worker i's hours last week, number of weeks worked last year, wage and
salary income last year, and CPS Person weight, respectively.34 Then the measures of group g's







































Let  be a set of gs: this is a larger group, such as all workers in the 15-19 age category,
comprised of smaller \disaggregated" groups. Our construction of an eciency wage measure for 
is similar to that of Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000): our eciency measurement






It is worth mentioning that the March CPS has a specic question \On average, how many
hours per week did you work last year, when you worked?" starting in 1976. We nd that making
34In the March supplement, we have both a CPS Basic Person weight, and a CPS Supplemental Person weight.
Personnel at the Census Bureau have advised us to use the latter for all the data questions we are addressing, even
though some of these data are not part of the March Annual Supplement.
35Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) use the wage in 1980 as the eciency measurement. We use an
average of the wage to allow for the possibility that the eciency measure varies over the cycle. Hence, by averaging
over ve years we aim to smooth the eciency measurement. The results remain the same using either eciency
measurement.
38sure the hours imputation is FT-status-tting leads to hours measures that are close to the post-
1976 question when both are available. By ignoring the FT-status, one underreports the groups'
hours.
Our data on hours come directly from the hours last week question. Likewise, our labor force
share data comes from a labor force status question pertaining to last week.
We have found that these last week hours have level shifts between the 1967 and 1968 survey
years and therefore start our hours series at 1968. The last year information used in the wage series
appears unaected during this time, so we use data going back to the 1964 survey year (data about
1963). The statistics on wages remain virtually identical if we start the wage series at survey year
1968.
39